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Abstract 
 
International commercial arbitration lacks any universally recognized standard-setting 
body. Equally, no arbitral sets of worldwide etiquette rules nor any statutes and conventions 
containing any specific exist - other than general principles, i.e. that arbitrators must be free 
of bias, respect the limits of their authority and give each side an opportunity to present its 
case - and arbitral institutions leave arbitrators wide discretion in establishing facts and 
interpreting contracts. On the other hand, in order for a practice to qualify as biased or 
abusive, some contemplation of alternatives are required. However, most often, perceptions of 
abuse rest on cultural assumptions about the baselines and yardsticks that measure “normal 
procedure”.  
This paper examines the issues and parameters entailed in the notions of impartiality 
and independence of arbitrators so as to denote the extent of the definition of their potential 
bias. It also critically assesses the 2014 IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International 
Arbitration and draws conclusions on the issue of bias of arbitrators in international 
commercial arbitration in the light of recent case law which is analysed as well as in the light 
of comparative analysis of the position in other jurisdictions (USA, France, Italy, Australia, 
Canada). 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
  It is well accepted that to assure a just and fair judgment the members of an arbitral 
tribunal must be neutral and unbiased both between the parties and in the subject-matter of the 
dispute. The differences in the various existing statutes, rules and guidelines as to the 
impartiality and independence of international arbitrators have often been more a question of 
form than substance. The main objection to this is the ongoing dispute of whether to apply a 
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subjective or an objective standard for measuring impartiality and independence of 
international arbitrators. Both the 2004 and the 2014 IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest 
in International Arbitration constitute an attempt to balance two conflicting policy goals, i.e. a) 
permitting the parties sufficient autonomy to select the arbitrator of their choice and b) 
protecting the parties’ right to have a full and timely disclosure in order to make their own 
judgments as to whether particular facts or circumstances give rise to reasonable doubts as to 
a proposed or sitting arbitrators’ impartiality or independence.1 In particular, the 2014 IBA 
Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, which constitute a revised 
version of the original 2004 rules2  have encouraged arbitrators directly and in response to 
demands of appointing authorities to disclose interests which may affect or be perceived to 
affect their impartiality or independence. Not least, these guidelines have also been of 
assistance to the court, as exemplified via reference to them in Sierra Fishing Co v Farran3 but 
were not followed by the court in W Ltd v M SDN BHD4 as our discussion below will show. 
 
2. INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY IN ARBITRATION.   
 
The right to an impartial and independent judge also exists in arbitration and is crucial 
to the entire arbitration process.5 Indeed, the mere fact that parties agree to settle their disputes 
by a private adjudicatory mechanism does not deprive them of the protections universally 
recognized as fundamental human rights. Because arbitration is a form of adjudication albeit a 
private one, it is important to secure, that the final outcome will be the result of an impartial 
process in which all sides have been fully heard. For parties to accept the outcome of an 
arbitration, even it if runs against them, they must be confident that those who sit in judgment 
do so fairly and with an open mind.6 “Independence” means that an arbitrator must be free from 
any involvement or relationship with any of the parties. As a general principle, arbitrators 
should be independent from the lawyers representing the parties. “Impartiality” deals with the 
arbitrator’s mental predisposition towards the parties or the subject matter or controversy at 
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3 Sierra Fishing Co v. Farran [2015] EWHC 140 at [58]. 
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Arbitration, 24th Ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2015, Ch. 4 paras. 4-011,4-022, 4-101 – 4-162. 
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hand. It is the interior frame of mind that the arbitrator brings to the reference. Impartiality is 
therefore referred to as a “subjective” standard.7  
There was no specific statement to this effect in arbitration legislation prior to the AA 
996, although the Arbitration Act 1950 did contain various provisions to secure impartiality. 
The AA 1996 Act reproduces those provisions in a slightly different form, but also makes 
general statements on the question.8 The English Arbitration Act 1996 (AA 1996) (Ch. 23 § 
24) allows parties to petition the court to remove an arbitrator “if circumstances exist that give 
rise to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality”. The English courts apply two tests to ascertain 
impartiality. The first is known as the “actual bias” test. Actual bias is hard to prove and 
practically never invoked. The second is an “apparent bias” test based on facts and 
circumstances which would indicate that there might be ground for bias.9 For example, the 
mere fact that a judge or arbitrator has a personal interest in the outcome of the case, suffices 
to disqualify the arbitrator. This test was formulated in the Dimes v. Proprietors of the Grand 
Junction Canal 10case.  
What is the difference between independence and impartiality? Independence is 
generally a function of prior or existing relationships that can be catalogued and verified, while 
impartiality is a state of mind. It has been said that independence is an “objective” standard, 
because it addresses the relationship between arbitrator and party, while impartiality is a 
“subjective” measure of a person’s inner attitude toward a party or a situation which can be 
seen from the outside only in the behaviour of the arbitrator. There may be objective grounds 
for disqualifying arbitrators which have nothing to do with their relationship or predisposition 
toward the parties or the dispute. This is the case when an arbitrator does not fulfil the 
contractually agreed and stipulated qualifications required by the arbitral agreement. The 
problem of independence and impartiality becomes acute when arbitrators from different 
backgrounds and with little or no international experience find themselves in an international 
commercial arbitration whereby the whole concept of independence and impartiality may be 
deeply coloured by their background. Again, no hard and fast rules exist. In the best of cases 
party appointed arbitrators are bridges to understanding. In the worst of cases they behave 
vociferously towards a party’s cause and, in doing so, lose credibility and standing within the 
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arbitral tribunal.11 The consequences of the challenge towards an arbitrator are a) the 
suspension of the arbitral proceedings, b) the replacement of the arbitrator and the continuation 
of the procedure (or if the arbitral rules or tribunal decides so, the repetition of either a part or 
of all of the proceedings).12  
In ASM Shipping Ltd of India v. TTMI Ltd of England13 a witness for the applicants about 
to give evidence discovered that one of the arbitrators was a QC who had been involved in earlier 
proceedings in which an application had been made to the court by the QC for the disclosure 
of documents in the witness’s possession. The witness gave evidence, and although the arbitrator 
was then asked to recuse himself he refused to do so. The applicants took no steps to have the 
arbitrator removed although they continued to protest to the respondents. An interim award was 
subsequently issued which was taken up by the applicants. The application which was 
subsequently made so as to have the arbitrator removed from further participation in the 
arbitration was rejected by Morison J. on the grounds of waiver. There had been no waiver 
simply by the witness giving evidence, as the timing of the events had not permitted otherwise, 
although the right to apply to the court had been waived by the applicants’ failure to act, by 
means of an application to the court under s. 24 AA 1996, immediately the arbitrator had failed 
to recuse himself.  By contrast, there was held to be no waiver in Sierra Fishing Co v. Farran14 
where the applicant in proceedings, to remove the arbitrator had applied to the arbitrator 
for the proceedings to be suspended, sought the appointment of a different tribunal, and tried 
to obtain information as to the date and place of the hearing. None of those acts was regarded by 
Popplewell J. as invoking the jurisdiction of the arbitrator.15 
 
3. THE ISSUE OF THE CHALLENGE OF ARBITRATORS 
 
Few anti-abuse mechanisms are more effective than an experienced and capable arbitral 
tribunal. Parties will also want to be clear about the procedural ground rules. In some cases, 
the threat of cost allocation can deter abuse. In extreme cases, frivolous motions and unfounded 
claims may even justify an order requiring the winner to bear the loser’s legal fees. However, 
perhaps the best way to avoid court related abuse is by choosing the right arbitral situs. In this 
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context, the most appropriate model of judicial review is one in which courts exercise limited 
control over matters of basic procedural fairness while leaving the arbitrators a relatively free 
rein on the merits of controversy.16 
Under English law, once a party becomes aware of grounds for doubting an arbitrator's 
impartiality there are a number of possible remedies available. First, the award itself may be 
challenged as having been obtained by reason of serious irregularity, under s.68(2)(a) AA 1996, 
on the basis that the arbitrator has failed to comply with the general duty under s.33 AA 1996 
on how to conduct the arbitration impartially. As a consequence, the court may set aside the 
award or remit it to the tribunal.15 However, where the tribunal (or member thereof) is biased, 
remittance is often neither realistic nor acceptable. In addition, s.68(2)(a) AA 1996 is 
concerned, not with potential breach of duty, but with actual breach of duty. Accordingly, in 
respect of any such challenge, it would have to be shown that the arbitrator failed to conduct 
the arbitration fairly, not merely that the arbitrator had some form of personal interest in the 
outcome. More far-reaching, however, is the second basis for challenge--an application to the 
court for the arbitrator's removal, under s.24(1)(a) AA 1996. Once the specific arbitrator has 
been removed, the arbitration of the particular dispute will continue once a replacement is 
appointed. However, in order to succeed under either provision, it will be necessary for the 
complainant to overcome any restriction caused by the principles applicable to waiver. A legal 
right will be taken as having been waived where a party with knowledge of his right (and its 
infringement) fails to take steps to enforce it. In this regard, a challenge should be made at the 
earliest opportunity, not least because of s.73(1) AA 1996 which, in reflecting general common 
law waiver principles, provides that, if a party to an arbitration takes part or continues to take 
part in proceedings, any objection must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity. A third, 
less likely, option, is that a party could challenge the award for lack of jurisdiction. If the 
arbitrator's impartiality was specifically required by the agreement, the challenge could be 
made under s.67 AA 1996 on the basis of lack of jurisdiction. 
The question of bias or partiality of a judge or an arbitrator should be judged from the 
perspective of a reasonable person, such that the court must consider whether or not the fair-
minded observer would consider that there was a real danger of bias. However, if a judge or 
arbitrator is (or, at the relevant time, was) unaware that he possessed some indirect interest in 
the outcome of the decision, it could not normally be said that there was a real likelihood of 
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bias on his part. Issues such as religion, ethnic or national origin, gender, age, class, financial 
status or sexual orientation will not normally be deemed to be relevant to an alleged lack of 
impartiality, nor would social or educational connections, service or employment backgrounds, 
political associations, membership of various bodies (such as social, sporting or charitable 
bodies), or previous business dealings. However, depending on the specific circumstances, they 
may well be, and the question falls to be determined on a case-by-case basis. 
 
3.01. REPEAT ARBITRATORS 
 
The increase of challenges to arbitrators is perhaps a reflection of the ever-growing 
community of international arbitration users. For international arbitrators, however, modern 
practice has raised surprisingly few ethical problems beyond the increasingly awkward 
requirement of disclosure on appointment and challenges. An emerging type of conflict of 
interest is repeated appointments creating a new category of arbitrators: “repeat arbitrators”.17 
The pivotal question is why repeated appointments need attention from the arbitral 
community? In other words: a) why should repeated appointments be disclosed? Repeated 
appointments should be disclosed to avoid removal of the arbitrator later in the process of the 
arbitration and to avoid a party seeking the use of the undisclosed repeated appointment as a 
reason to challenge or set aside the award. b) who are repeat arbitrators? Repeat arbitrators is 
a term referring to situations in which the same party or companies belonging to the same group 
of companies as the party, appoint the same arbitrator in several arbitrations c) when do 
repeated appointments require disclosure? This is very difficult to define. Repetition of 
appointment does not necessarily mean monopoly of appointment, however where the repeated 
appointment has occurred more than once a year, practice has dictated that in such a case 
perhaps the non-disclosure will lead to arguments on the impartiality and independence of the 
arbitrator, then such a repeated appointment should be disclosed.18 d) what consequences 
follow the failure to disclose? There will not occur an automatic challenge of the arbitrator. 
Indeed, although failure to disclose may raise eyebrows such a fact should not per se lead to 
disqualification. It should rather be a factor of aggravation in the review of the arbitrator’s 
independence and impartiality.19 
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No.1, 103-119, 103-104.  
18 Ibid, 109-115. 
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3.02. THE CASE LAW 
 
Arbitrators have a general duty to disclose any circumstance that may raise doubts as 
to their impartiality, regardless of whether or not the parties could have known through due 
diligence or other available procedural steps. 
There is a plethora of cases in England on the apparent bias of arbitrators. Amidst those, 
of the most recent are Sierra Fishing Company v Farran20, Cofely Ltd v Bingham21, and W Ltd 
v M SDN BHD22 which all have emerged in the recent years and have indeed provided food for 
thought. W Ltd v M SDN BHD23 is particularly important, because Knowles J. refused to follow 
the IBA Guidelines and indeed held that they were wrong in including in the non-waivable red 
list the situation where the arbitrator’s law firm advises an affiliate of one of the parties. In 
Cofely Ltd v Bingham24, the court removed an arbitrator on the ground of apparent bias where 
18 per cent of his appointments and 25 per cent of his arbitrator income over the previous three 
years derived from cases involving the defendant. Not only did the evidence establish that the 
defendant routinely influenced arbitrator appointments in his favour, but also that the arbitrator 
had failed to disclose his past involvement with the defendant, as required by the Chartered 
Institute of Arbitrators' Code of Professional and Ethical Conduct for Members.   
 
3.02.A. ANALYSIS OF THE CASES 
 
In Sierra Fishing Company v Farran25 Sierra Fishing Company (SFC), a Sierra 
Leonean company, and its affiliates stipulated a loan agreement with two lenders (Dr Farran 
and Mr Assad) to finance the purchase of two fishing vessels. The loan agreement provided for 
an arbitration agreement. 26 When repayments ceased, the lenders introduced an arbitration in 
London and appointed Mr Zbeeb as their arbitrator in 2012, while SFC and its affiliates did not 
appoint any arbitrator. Therefore Mr Zbeeb acted as sole arbitrator. In 2012 and 2013, the 
arbitration proceedings were suspended and settlement negotiations took place in which Mr 
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23 Ibid 
24 Cofely Ltd v. Bingham [2016] EWHC 240 (Comm) 
25 Sierra Fishing Company v. Farran [2015] EWHC 140 (Comm)  
26 Antonio Musella and Ziva Filipic, International arbitration and alternative dispute resolution, I.B.L.J. 2015, 
4, 381-387, 383. 
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Zbeeb was involved. The settlement agreements were not fully performed, and the lenders 
recommenced the arbitration, where SFC expressed doubts as to the impartiality of the sole 
arbitrator. SFC alleged the existence of a relationship between a lender (Farran) and the 
arbitrator's father (its legal counsel). The sole arbitrator refused to resign, claiming that (i) he 
had been validly appointed, (ii) the party had to ascertain whether circumstances existed 
leading to doubts as to his impartiality and (iii) the right to objection had been lost according 
to s.73 of the Arbitration Act 1996. SFC applied to the High Court to have the arbitrator 
removed on the ground of apparent bias (pursuant to s.24 of the Arbitration Act 1996). The 
Court found that there had been apparent bias and removed the sole arbitrator. In fact, the Court 
analysed if there were circumstances giving rise to justifiable doubts, on his connection, 
involvement and behaviour, finding justified doubts as to his impartiality. In addition, the Court 
verified that the applicants lost their right of challenge by first not taking part in the arbitration 
proceedings and only raising its objection at later stage. The Court considered separately 
whether the SFC had lost the right to rely on each set of circumstances, deciding that the right 
was not lost and, notably, also held that when a party has not already been effectively taking 
part, that their silence, inactivity or even neutral acts are not sufficient to lose the right to 
object.27 
In Cofely Ltd v Bingham28 during the arbitration of a construction dispute, the claimant 
applied under the Arbitration Act 1996 s.24(1)(a) to remove the arbitrator on the ground of 
apparent bias. The arbitrator had been appointed by the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators at the 
request of the second defendant, in spite of the claimant’s disagreement and proposal for the 
appointment of a different candidate. Two years later the claimant became concerned about the 
arbitrator's appointment after a decision in Eurocom Ltd v Siemens Plc29  a case involving the 
defendant and the same arbitrator where the defendant had been found to have made fraudulent 
misrepresentations to influence the arbitrator's appointment. The claimant submitted that 
Eurocom Ltd v Siemens Plc30 encouraged a belief that the defendant was keen to use the 
arbitrator and exclude other potential arbitrators, possibly because the arbitrator was 
predisposed to treat the defendant favourably. The court in asserted whether there were 
circumstances which gave rise to justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator’s impartiality resorted 
to Locobail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield Properties Ltd31 where the Court of Appeal had held that the 
                                                          
27 Ibid, 384. 
28 Cofely Ltd v. Bingham [2016] EWHC 240 (Comm) 
29 Eurocom Ltd v. Siemens Plc [2014] EWHC 3710 (TCC), [2015] B.L.R. 1. 
30 Ibid.  
31 Locobail (UK) Ltd v. Bayfield Properties Ltd [2000] QB 451 
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common law test for apparent bias is reflected in s. 24 AA 1996 and that the common law test 
is that articulated by Lord Hope of Craighead in Porter v Magill32 namely whether “the fair-
minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a 
real possibility that the tribunal was biased.” Lord Hope gave a further explanation of what was 
meant by “fair-minded” and “informed” in Helow v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department33.  In addition, the claimants relied on four aspects of the evidence as giving rise 
to such apparent bias, i.e. the legal and business connection between the arbitrator and the 
defendant. The Court sought assistance from 2014 IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in 
International Arbitration (IBA Guidelines), whereby as per General Standard 6 the fact that the 
arbitrator's law firm may have dealings with one of the parties does not automatically give rise 
to a conflict of interest requiring disclosure and that all depends on the circumstances of each 
individual case.  However as per the Red List of the IBA Guidelines which lists those 
circumstances regarded as giving rise to justifiable doubts about the arbitrator's impartiality or 
independence and is divided into a Non-Waivable Red List and a Waivable Red List, one of 
only four situations identified in the Non-Waivable Red List is where “the arbitrator regularly 
advises the appointing party or an affiliate of the appointing party, and the arbitrator or his or 
her firm derives a significant financial income therefrom” (paragraph 1.4). Hence the court felt 
that the state of the evidence in this case would leave the fair-minded observer concluding that 
there was a real possibility that the relationship between the claimant and the arbitrator fell 
within these criteria. The above coupled with the involvement of the arbitrator in advising and 
assisting in the settlement negotiations and in the drafting of the agreements was to be 
considered in the mind of a fair-minded observer as a ground for bias. The claimant also 
asserted that the arbitrator's response to its questions, and his defensive and hostile approach, 
increased concern that he might be biased. The arbitrator argued that the grounds for the 
application were irrelevant because all the appointments had been made by an appointing body 
rather than by the defendant itself.  
The court granted the application and held that there was apparent and established bias 
resulting from the arbitrator's relationship with the defendant. It was immaterial that the 
appointments might have been made by an appointing body rather than by the party itself. The 
evidence showed that the defendant influenced arbitrator appointments positively or negatively 
                                                          
32 Porter v. Magill [2002] AC 357, at [103]. 
33 Helow v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] 1 WLR 2416 at paras [1]-[3]; See also Laker 
Airways Inc v. FLS Aerospace Ltd [1999] 2 Lloyd's Rep 45 per Rix J at pp. 48–49 and A v. B [2011] 2 Lloyd's 
Rep 591 per Flaux J at paragraphs [21] to [29].  
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as a matter of general practice by putting forward the name of its chosen representative or a list 
of potential appointees whom it considered inappropriate, or by identifying required 
characteristics that would only be shared by a small pool of people. It was particularly 
significant that it had an appointment "blacklist" whereby arbitrators could fall out of favour 
depending on their conduct. That would be important for an adjudicator whose appointments 
and income were materially dependant on cases involving the defendant, following also 
Eurocom Ltd v Siemens Plc34. The court also held that it was reasonable for the claimant to 
enquire into the nature of the relationship between the arbitrator and the defendant and that the 
arbitrator had requested a meeting whereby he had sought to pre-empt the claimant's 
information-gathering process by pressurising the claimant into acknowledging that there was 
no issue to be explored. The Court found that the arbitrator's lack of awareness of his conduct 
being inappropriate demonstrated a lack of objectivity and an increased risk of unconscious 
bias and hence that the claimant had established the requisite grounds for removal of the 
arbitrator.  
In W Ltd v M SDN BHD35 is a strange case in that the court denied to follow the IBA 
Guidelines 2014 para.1.4 which stated that there would be a non-waivable conflict of interest 
where "the arbitrator or his or her firm regularly advises the party, or an affiliate of the party, 
and the arbitrator or his or her firm derives significant financial income therefrom". The court 
commended the objective of the guidelines, but explained why some of the provisions dealing 
with non-waiver of certain conflict of interest situations were weak and could not be given 
judicial approval. The applicant sought to challenge an arbitration award on the ground of 
serious irregularity in the form of apparent bias by the arbitrator due to the fact that they alleged 
a conflict of interest arising from the fact that the firm of the arbitrator had regularly advised a 
company which had the same corporate parent as the respondent, and had earned substantial 
remuneration from doing so. The applicant relied on the fact that the provision in the IBA 
Guidelines 2014 para.1.4, appeared in a "non-waivable" list, the effect of which was that the 
parties could not waive the conflict of interest which was said to arise. The court refused the 
application and the existence of bias stating that the arbitrator operated effectively as a sole 
practitioner within the firm, using its secretarial and administrative resources for his work as 
an arbitrator, and such a secretarial support would not amount in the mind of a fair-minded and 
informed observer as a case or possibility of bias.  The court was also of the opinion that the 
                                                          
34 Eurocom Ltd v. Siemens Plc [2014] EWHC 3710 (TCC), [2015] B.L.R. 1. 
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IBA guidelines were not binding on the court but that their sole objective was to assist courts36 
in assessing impartiality and independence. In any case the court felt that in the interest of 
justice it would be more appropriate to deal with such situations on a case-specific basis and 
added that there was a tension between some of the "general standards" dealing with 
independence and impartiality, and inconsistency between the situations included or not 
included in the non-waivable list.37  
 
4. THE POSITION UNDER THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW 
 
Challenging the arbitrator during proceedings is the earliest possibility for unilateral 
punitive measures. Parties who wish to challenge should first exhaust possibilities for review 
by the tribunal itself or the relevant arbitral institution. Parties may then apply to the court that 
has jurisdiction, which is usually the court at the seat of arbitration.  
The UNCITRAL Model Law explicitly states that an arbitrator may be challenged "if 
he does not possess qualifications agreed to by the parties".38 On a more fundamental level, one 
could look to the nature of the qualifications agreed to by the parties. Even if the lex 
arbitri does not provide for a specific ground of challenge in this context; the parties agreed to 
arbitrate under the condition that the arbitrator adjudicating the case would have these 
qualifications. These qualifications are therefore directly linked to the consent of the parties, 
which in turn provides the underpinning for the power of the arbitrators to decide the dispute 
in the first place. Apart from an either de jure or de facto inability to perform his 
function,39 there is no clear ground in the UNCITRAL Model Law to remove an arbitrator for 
lacking certain qualities if these qualities are not agreed upon by the parties. Other rules have 
a similar philosophy, i.e. once an arbitrator is appointed, neither of the rules of the International 
Centre for Dispute Resolution of the American Arbitration Association (ICDR), or of the 
Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC), or of the Singapore 
International Arbitration Centre (SIAC), or of the ICC, or of the LCIA provide any clear ground 
for a challenge on quality either. In this context, practitioners have complained that there are 
few or no controls on the conduct of an arbitrator after appointment. Lord Hacking has written 
                                                          
36 Sierra Fishing Company and others v. Farran and others [2015] EWHC 140 (Comm); [2015] 1 All ER (Comm) 
560 at [58] per Popplewell J and Cofely Limited v. Anthony Bingham [2016] EWHC 240 (Comm) at [109] per 
Hamblen J. 
37 As per  Knowles J. in paras 26, 33-39, 43, W Ltd v. M SDN BHD [2016] EWHC 422 (Comm). 
38 UNCITRAL Model Law 2006 art.12(2). 
39 Ibid, art.14(1) 
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that it is open to parties to make a challenge based on an alleged lack of qualification under the 
ICC and LCIA rules. His reasoning is that the ICC Rules art.9 and the LCIA Rules art.11 refer 
to the "ability" and "suitability" of the arbitrator respectively.40 However, these rules only 
provide for a ground for the ICC or LCIA Court to refuse appointment. This does not mean the 
parties can use a lack of ability or suitability as a ground for challenge, especially if proceedings 
are already well under way.  
However, an entirely different situation arises when a party wishes to challenge an 
arbitrator for an (alleged) lack of impartiality or independence. The vast majority of arbitration 
laws and institutional rules recognise a lack of independence or impartiality as grounds for a 
challenge. This includes the UNCITRAL Model Law as well as the institutional rules of the 
LCIA, the SCC, the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC) and the ICDR.41 
After an award has been made, a party can apply to set the award aside in the court at the seat 
of the arbitration. The lex arbitri generally sets out the grounds for setting aside an award and 
a distinction can be made between jurisdictional grounds, procedural defects and legal errors. 
Under the UNCITRAL Model Law, an arbitral award may be set aside when the party making 
the application proves that the composition of the arbitral tribunal was not in accordance with 
the agreement of the parties or the law itself.42 However, the award is final and binding on the 
parties if the correct procedures have been followed when appointing the arbitrator and the 
formalities are observed. There is seldom room for any form of appeal, or for any judicial 
review of the award on its merits, even if the quality of the decision is very questionable. In the 
context of impartiality and independence, an award may be set aside under the UNCITRAL 
Model Law if the applying party proves it was unable to present its case,43  or if the competent 
court finds that the award is in conflict with the public policy of its state.44, 45 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
40 Lord Hacking, "Challenges: theirs is to reason why" (2006) 1(6) Global Arbitration Review 27. 
41 See respectively the UNCITRAL Model Law 2006 art.12(1), the LCIA Arbitration Rules 1998 art.10.3, the 
SCC Rules 2010 art.15(1), the ICDR Arbitration Rules 2009 art.8(1) and the HKIAC Administered Arbitration 
Rules 2008 art.11.4. 
42 UNCITRAL Model Law 2006 art.34(2)(a)(iv). 
43 Ibid, art.34(2)(a)(ii). 
44 Ibid, art.34(2)(b)(ii).  
45 L.J.E. Timmer, The Quality, Independence and Impartiality of the Arbitrator in International Commercial 
Arbitration, Arbitration 2012, 78(4), 348-358, 354-356 
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5. THE 2014 IBA GUIDELINES 
 
The ordinary test for impartiality, that a fair minded and informed observer, having 
considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility that the tribunal was 
biased, has been amplified in the context of international arbitration by the International Bar 
Association Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, published in 
2014.46  
The current IBA Guidelines were adopted by resolution of the Council of the 
International Bar Association on 30 October 2014. The original 2004 Guidelines were drafted 
by a Working Group of 19 experts from 15 countries. In 2012 a review was initiated and this 
was conducted by an expanded Conflicts of Interest Subcommittee of 27 members from 19 
countries “representing diverse cultures and a range of perspectives, including counsel, 
arbitrators and arbitration users”. The 2014 IBA Guidelines comprise General Standards, 
Explanatory Notes on Standards, and what are called Application Lists.47    
Important changes from the 2004 to 2014 Guidelines include provision in General 
Standard 6(b) to make it clear that third party funders may be considered to be identified with 
or the equivalent of the party in question. Therefore, the existence of third party funding can 
be expected to be required to be disclosed. Further, General Standard 7(b) has now clarified 
that it is the responsibility of the parties to inform the arbitrators of the identity of their legal 
representatives and counsel and to identify whether any relationship exists between those 
representatives and the arbitrators. Included now in the Orange list for the first time is whether 
an arbitrator and co arbitrator, or arbitrator and party counsel are currently acting or have acted 
together as co-counsel in another matter in the last three years. Green matters need not be 
disclosed. The entire process is not binding, does not have any force of law or contract. No 
international arbitration institution has actually adopted the Guidelines. Both the LCIA and the 
ICC in considering whether to confirm or uphold a challenge to a nominee have indicated that 
they do not simply apply or adopt the Guidelines. Nevertheless, in the wider community of 
international arbitration amongst practitioners and arbitrators, the Guidelines have gained 
traction. The process of identification and categorisation of specific examples of potential 
problem has been found to be helpful to arbitrators and parties alike. Frequently parties feel 
uneasy about raising a question over an appointee’s independence. The IBA Guidelines give 
                                                          
46 R. Merkin, Arbitration Law, Informa, 2016, Ch. 10. 10.22-10.33; D.S.J. Sutton, J.Gill, M.Gearing, Russel on 
Arbitration, 24th Ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2015, Ch. 4 paras. 4-011,4-022, 4-101 – 4-162.  
47 Described as lists of “specific situations indicating whether they warrant disclosure or disqualification.  
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parties confidence and a tangible underpinning for such questions to be raised. 
  Those purporting that the 2014 IBA Guidelines have no other role than to assist in 
assessing impartiality and independence, commend their value but are sceptical of the fact that 
the 2014 IBA Guidelines contain no specific explanation of why the change was made to the 
text of Paragraph 1.4 of the Non-Waivable Red List so as to include the situation where the 
arbitrator's firm regularly advises a party, or an affiliate of a party, but the arbitrator does not. 
They also seem to maintain this positions in spite of the fact that Paragraph 2 of Part II of the 
2014 IBA Guidelines, under the heading “Practical Application of the General Standards”, 
expressly qualifies the proposition that the Non-Waivable Red List details specific situations 
that give rise to justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator's impartiality and independence with the 
phrase “depending on the facts of a given case”. They also contempt that it is for two reasons 
that it is unlikely that the IBA Guidelines will become the predominant influence in the disposal 
of s.24 or s.68 applications in the Commercial Court, i.e. first, because the IBA Guidelines 
address the twin pillars of impartiality and independence, whereas the AA 1996 only refers to 
impartiality and secondly because as they purport, in practice a great number of the most 
commonly encountered problems are of the distinct Orange variety. Notwithstanding the above 
arguments, there is one aspect of the 2014 IBA Guidelines which has undoubtedly been of 
considerable influence, i.e. the question of disclosure and the need and desirability of 
continuing disclosure in arbitration. 
 Those in favour of the stance that the 2014 IBA Guidelines have a more binding effect 
other than being guidelines as their name dictates, stress out the fact that the IBA Working 
Group that finalized them engaged in a careful scrutiny and continuous debate of their national 
legal systems so as to finalize the selection of credible, efficient and fair guidance in resolving 
difficult conflict issues impacting on the parties, arbitrators, international organisations, states 
and their courts alike. They also support the logical view that although not carved in stone, they 
were intended to provide guidance in identifying, responding to and resolving conflicts by both 
codifying existing arbitral practice and filling gaps in the law to arrive at the most suitable 
international arbitral practice. Moreover, it is submitted that they provide additional 
information and further assistance in regard to how to resolve issues of independence and 
impartiality in a range of illustrative scenarios, or “situations” contained in the relevant lists.48 
The Guidelines provide a general definition of Impartiality and Independence, in art. 
                                                          
48 L. Trackman, The Impartiality and Independence of Arbitrators Reconsidered, Int. A.L.R. 2007, 10(4), 124-
135, 128-129. 
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2.1.49 It is perhaps more logical for independence to precede impartiality. The Guidelines also 
follow the Model Law in setting an objective standard for the disqualification of an arbitrator 
on grounds of partiality or lack of independence. An arbitrator shall decline appointment or 
refuse to continue to act as an arbitrator if facts or circumstances exist that, from a reasonable 
person's point of view having knowledge of the relevant facts, give rise to “justifiable doubts” 
as to the arbitrator's impartiality or independence.  
Perhaps the most useful, and also one of the most troubling aspects of the IBA 
Guidelines is its categorisation of “situations” into which arbitral impartiality and 
independence are divided. Based on a variety of cases in multiple jurisdictions, the Working 
Group broke up different factual situations giving rise to concerns about conflict of interest 
into three lists: Red, Orange and Green. The Red List consisted of situations which give rise to 
per se doubt as to an arbitrator's impartiality and independence. This list is again divided into 
situations that cannot be waived by the parties and those that can be so waived. The Orange 
List consists of specific situations in which the parties might reasonably have doubts about the 
arbitrator's impartiality or independence. The arbitrator has a duty of disclosure in such cases; 
however, the parties can waive, or be deemed to waive, that duty. The Green List consists of 
situations in which there is no appearance of partiality or a lack of independence and no 
conflicts of interest. The benefit of the lists is that they provide a cross-section of illustrations 
based on past practice in which arbitrators and parties can identify situations of conflicts of 
interest, as well as the perceived significance of that conflict, and in the case of the Red List, 
how parties can cure conflicts through consent. The problem is that the lists also provide 
litigious parties with a list of circumstances in which they might ground such a challenge, 
spuriously or not.  
The 2014 IBA Guidelines are not binding on the English courts, but have been used 
to provide guidance, as a check on the decision reached by the court.50, 51 The 2014 IBA 
Guidelines are innovative in finding new solutions to old problems. At the same time, they are 
not without controversy. Among the more controversial, the 2014 IBA Guidelines impose a 
shared obligation on arbitrators and parties to make reasonable enquiries to uncover any 
potential conflicts of interest at the outset of the arbitration.  However, shifting part of the 
                                                          
49 Article 2.1 states: “An arbitrator may be challenged only if circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts 
as to his impartiality or independence, or if he does not possess qualifications agreed to by the parties.” 
50 R. Merkin, Arbitration Law, Informa, 2016, Ch. 10., 10.21.; D.S.J. Sutton, J.Gill, M.Gearing, Russel on 
Arbitration, 24th Ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2015, Ch. 4 paras. 4-011,4-022, 4-101 – 4-162.  
51 A v. B [2011] EWHC 2345 (Comm); Sierra Fishing Co v. Farran [2015] EWHC 140 (Comm); Cofely Ltd v. 
Bingham [2016] EWHC 240 (Comm); H v. L and Ors [2017] EWHC 137 (Comm). 
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burden to uncover material conflicts to the parties may well be realistic insofar as the parties 
often are in a better position to identify conflicts than the arbitrators. Such novelty should not 
be unwelcomed as reform is always entailing some cost and adopted solutions cannot lead to 
positive outcomes for all groups.  Overall, the 2014 IBA Guidelines represent meaningful 
progress.52 However, the 2014 IBA Guidelines have in at least one respect, i.e. in the case of W 
Ltd v. M SDN BHD53 been regarded as too rigid. As our discussion illustrated, W Ltd v. M SDN 
BHD54 shows the limits of the principle that remote relationships involving legal advice do not 
give rise to potential bias. As suggested55 the ruling by Knowles J. in W Ltd v. M SDN BHD56 
whereby he supported the view that  there was no basis for any suggestion of potential bias, 
and that paragraph 1.4 ought not to be in the Non-Waivable Red List, was incorrect in equating 
advice given to a party to the arbitration and to an affiliate to a party to the arbitration and failed 
to take account of whether on the facts of the case there could be a realistic effect on impartiality 
or independence. The principle that there is no apparent bias because the arbitrator is a 
lawyer with connections to the lawyers of one of the parties may, however, break down where 
there have been allegations of dishonesty as shown in cases such as Sierra Fishing Co v. 
Farran57and Cofely Ltd v. Bingham58. The latter case serves as proof that an arbitrator who 
becomes commercially reliant on a party faces a finding that there are objective grounds to 
question his independence, however there are necessarily limits on this, as this has been pointed 
out by Popplewell J. in H v. L and Ors59 which shapes the principle that single events can give rise 
to multiple disputes and the expert arbitrators in that field may find themselves called upon in 
more than one case which in turn might be advantageous in terms of the speed with which any 
one matter can be resolved.60  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
52 L. Trackman, The Impartiality and Independence of Arbitrators Reconsidered, Int. A.L.R. 2007, 10(4), 124-
135, 134-135.  
53 W Ltd v. M SDN BHD [2016] EWHC 422 (Comm) 
54 Ibid.  
55 R. Merkin, Arbitration Law, Informa, 2016, Ch. 10.; D.S.J. Sutton, J.Gill, M.Gearing, Russel on Arbitration, 
24th Ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2015, Ch. 4 paras. 4-011,4-022, 4-101 – 4-162. 
56 W Ltd v. M SDN BHD [2016] EWHC 422 (Comm) 
57 Sierra Fishing Co v. Farran [2015] EWHC 140 (Comm); 
58 Cofely Ltd v. Bingham [2016] EWHC 240 (Comm) 
59 H v. L and Ors [2017] EWHC 137 (Comm). 
60 R. Merkin, Arbitration Law, Informa, 2016, Ch. 10.; D.S.J. Sutton, J.Gill, M.Gearing, Russel on Arbitration, 
24th Ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2015, Ch. 4 paras. 4-011,4-022, 4-101 – 4-162.  
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6. THE 2017 SINGAPORE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CENTRE (SIAC) 
PRACTICE NOTE PN – 01/17 (31.3.2017) 
 
The growth in litigation funding, and its spread to arbitration, has given rise to the risk 
that arbitrators are linked with the funding companies. In March 2017, the Singapore 
International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) adopted guidance for arbitrators regarding disclosure 
in relation to cases involving external funding.  
The guidance set as Practice Note PN-01/17 (31.3.2017) sets out standards of practice 
and conduct to be observed by arbitrators in respect of arbitration proceedings administered by 
the SIAC, under the Arbitration Rules of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (“SIAC 
Rules”) where the involvement of an External Funder in arbitration proceedings is permissible.  
The Practice Note was not ever meant to supplement an arbitrator’s obligations under 
the SIAC Rules, and is not intended to replace any existing ethical standard or code of conduct 
which may apply to arbitrators under any applicable arbitration agreement, professional or 
disciplinary rules, or mandatory laws and regulations.  
Under article 4 of Practice Note PN-01/17 (31.3.2017) it is stated, in relation to 
impartiality and independence, that any potential candidate for appointment as an arbitrator 
shall disclose to the Registrar and the Disputant Parties, any circumstances that may give rise 
to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality or independence, including any relationship whether 
direct or indirect, with an External Funder, as soon as reasonably practicable and in any event 
before his appointment.   
Similarly, under articles 5-8 of Practice Note PN-01/17 (31.3.2017) it is stated, in 
relation to disclosure that: a) unless otherwise agreed, the arbitral tribunal shall have the power 
to conduct such enquiries as may appear as necessary or expedient, which shall include 
ordering the disclosure of the existence of any funding relationship with an external funder 
and/or the identity of the external funder and, where appropriate, details of the external funder’s 
interest in the outcome of the proceedings, and/or whether or not the external funder has 
committed to undertake adverse costs liability (art. 5); b) an arbitrator is under the duty to 
immediately disclose to the parties, the other arbitrators and to the registrar any circumstances 
that may give rise to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality or independence, including any 
relationship whether direct or indirect, with an external funder, that may be discovered or arise 
during the arbitration proceedings (art. 6); c) the arbitral tribunal might request that the parties 
agree to inform the arbitral tribunal and the registrar, at the earliest opportunity, of the 
involvement of an external funder in the arbitration proceedings or any withdrawal or change 
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of external funder (art. 7); and d)  the arbitral tribunal has the duty to inform the parties of their 
continuing obligation to inform the arbitral tribunal and the registrar, at the earliest opportunity, 
of the involvement of an external funder in the arbitration proceedings or any withdrawal or 
change of external funder (art. 8).  
 In an era where the norm tends to have become to have funding in both litigation and 
in arbitration, the position of SIAC in adopting such a stance to safeguard the interests of the 
disputant parties and to promote arbitral efficiency by stipulating such details rules in relation 
to the disclosure duties of arbitrators as well as the threshold for their independence and 
impartiality in relation to cases of external funding, is remarkable. Those who will rush into 
criticising the imposition of such rules as too restrictive and hence as per their view destructive 
rather than constructive for arbitration, should think twice before endorsing such a view.  
   
7. THE POSITION IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
 
7.1. THE UNITED STATES  
 
Even though the ABA/AAA Code of Ethics contemplates party-appointed arbitrator 
predisposition, the nominee to an international arbitration with its seat in the United States must 
be careful not to adopt such a posture unless clearly authorized by the parties.  International 
arbitrations held in the U.S. are governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (9 USCS) (FAA) 
which pre-empts any conflicting State legislation. The FAA requires all members of an arbitral 
tribunal to maintain the same degree of impartiality. In the Standard Tankers (Bahamas) Co. 
Ltd. v Motor Tank Vessel, AKTI 61 case it was held that court shall vacate an award where there 
was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators and that the evident partiality test should 
apply to every member of the panel. Generally speaking, in American practice the degree of 
partiality to be avoided is that of evident partiality which is more than a mere appearance of 
bias but less than actual bias. Evident partiality would be found where a reasonable person 
would have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial to one party.62 This standard, which is 
widely used by USA courts to challenge an arbitrator for bias, is less stringent than that 
appropriate for a judge because of the commercial reality that arbitrators will often have some 
degree of professional association with the parties or familiarity with the subject in issue. A 
                                                          
61 Standard Tankers (Bahamas) Co. Ltd. v. Motor Tank Vessel, AKTI 438 F. Supp. 153 (1977) at 159. 
62 Morelite Const. Corp. v. New York City District Council Carpenters Benefit Funds, 748 F. 2d 79 (1984). 
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curious gap in the FAA leaves the parties no avenue of judicial review of an appointment until 
after an award has been rendered unless the rules of procedure adopted provide for earlier 
review.63 This is unfortunate in that a party with a valid objection to the composition of the 
tribunal would have to make the objection on the record and then wait until the end of the case 
before challenging the award itself.  
The FAA does not specify any duty of disclosure of interest in or connection with the 
dispute or the parties but the courts have interpreted the duty of avoiding evident partiality as 
including a strict duty of disclosure. The Supreme Court of the United States set a very high 
standard in the Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v Continental Casualty Co.64 case by requiring 
disclosure of any dealings which might create an impression of bias. In that case the award was 
set aside even though the award was unanimous and there was a finding that there was no actual 
bias. One of the arbitrators had failed to disclose material facts regarding business connections 
with one of the parties. However, Mr Justice White, in a judgment concurring in the majority 
decision, stated that remote business connections need not be disclosed and that the Act did not 
call for a complete and unexpurgated business biography.65 The same requirement of disclosure 
would extend to social connections with the parties, their counsel and perhaps witnesses.66 
There is likewise no specific statutory prohibition against ex parte communications with the 
parties but such a requirement in all but the most trivial of circumstances would be subsumed 
under the rule against evident partiality. The FAA also does not address the issue of whether a 
majority award is required. This would be left to the parties to decide ad hoc or through the 
adoption of institutional rules.67 
 
 7.2.  FRANCE 
 
In France, international commercial arbitrations are governed by Articles 1442 to 1507 
of the Code of Civil Procedure. Arbitrators in France are held to the same standard of 
impartiality as a judge and no distinction is made between the standard expected of a party-
appointed arbitrator and that of the third arbitrator. The requirements for a judge are found in 
Article 341 of the Code of Civil Procedure but this Article does not specifically refer to 
arbitrators. 
                                                          
63 Florasynth, Inc. v. Pickholz 750 F. 2d 171 (1984); Hunt v Mobil Oil Corp., 583 F. Supp. 1092 (1984). 
64 Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co. 393 U.S. 145 (1968). 
65 Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co. 393 U.S. 145 (1968) at 152. 
66 Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co. 714 F.2d 673 (1983). 
67 M.L. Smith, Impartiality of the Party-Appointed Arbitrator, Arbitration 1992, 58(1), 30-42, 31-33. 
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There is some debate as to the right of a party to an arbitration governed by French law 
to seek judicial review of an appointment when the parties have provided for a review 
mechanism through the adoption of institutional rules such as the ICC Rules. In most respects 
the courts will not review the final ruling of a body such as the ICC regarding the composition 
of a tribunal since this is viewed as within the exclusive competence of the institution as an 
administrative not jurisdictional matter. But doubt exists as to whether this would be restricted 
only to matters of pure formality and not questions of bias. 
By the same reasoning, Article 1504 of the Code of Civil Procedure would allow an 
arbitral award in France in international arbitral proceedings to be set aside by a court where 
an arbitrator lacked impartiality. The foregoing comment on French law is also relevant to the 
ground for refusal of recognition and enforcement under Article V para. (2) of the New York 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards for violation of 
public policy. Challenges to an arbitrator may be brought during the course of the proceedings, 
as per articles 1457 and 1463, and article 1452 requires disclosure of any personal cause of 
disqualification the arbitrator has knowledge of. Ex parte communications would be prohibited 
under the general rule requiring impartiality and Article 1469 specifically states that the 
deliberations are secret. Finally, article 1470 provides that the award is to be rendered by 
majority vote.68 
 
 7.3.  SWITZERLAND  
 
International arbitrations are covered by the Swiss International Arbitration Law which 
is Chapter 12 of the Swiss Private International Law Act. Where at least one of the parties is 
not domiciled or habitually resident in Switzerland, the Swiss Private International Law Act 
replaces cantonal law unless the parties choose otherwise (Article 176). 
Considerable autonomy is left to the parties regarding the composition of the arbitral 
tribunal and if for example the parties have chosen the ICC Rules, the Swiss courts will not 
interfere in matters related to the appointment, removal or replacement of arbitrators as 
prescribed by the Institution. (Article 179) These matters are viewed as administrative. 
However, like France, there is an exception with respect to impartiality of the arbitrators. 
Article 180(1) (c) provides for the challenge of an arbitrator if circumstances give rise to 
justifiable doubts as to his independence. The restriction only to the case of doubts as to the 
                                                          
68 Ibid, 34. 
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arbitrator’s independence and not also in relation to the arbitrator’s alleged impartiality in the 
new law is an attempt by Swiss law to restrict the requirement to the more objective notion of 
independence alone as a compromise designed to meet the exigencies of practice. In addition, 
such an absence of a requirement of impartiality might also be seen to allow for a party-
appointed arbitrator who is predisposed to his nominating party but it is submitted that this 
would not be a correct conclusion to draw. The Swiss Private International Law Act is silent 
as to prohibition of ex parte communications with the parties and the confidentiality of the 
deliberations.69  
 
7.4.  ITALY 
 
The rules of Italian Law governing arbitration are mostly contained in the Civil Procedure, 
Fourth Book, Eighth Title, art. 806-840. Law no. 25 which was passed on 5 Feb. 1994 brought 
substantive changes to the way the Italian legislature addressed arbitration. Article 836 of the 
Italian Civil Procedure Code deals with the issue of challenge and removal of arbitrators and 
provides for specific substantial and procedural rules, i.e. the duty of a judge to abstain from 
the procedure upon the occurrence of the cases enumerated in art. 51,52 of the Italian Civil 
Procedure Code. In addition, the AIA (Italian Association for Arbitration) and the Milan 
International Arbitral Chamber through their rules impose on arbitrators a duty to disclose facts 
and circumstances relevant to their independence. In addition article 55 of the Ethical Code of 
the Italian Bar Association is devoted to ethical standards that a practising lawyer acting as 
arbitrator must abide with. The subject of impartiality of arbitrators is dealt with efficiently 
under Law no. 25 of 5 Feb. 1994. Parties are free to decide the selection of arbitrators and the 
criteria for their disqualification in case of impartiality. If not such agreement is made 
arbitrators are bound by the same criteria as judges in relation to impartiality and independence 
(art. 51,52 Italian Civil Procedure Code).70 
 
7.5. CANADA 
 
Under Canadian constitutional law every jurisdiction has authority to enact legislation 
governing international arbitrations. All of Canada's ten provinces and two territories have 
                                                          
69 Ibid, 35. 
70 T. Tampieri, International Arbitration and Impartiality of Arbitrators, The Italian Perspective, Journal of 
International Arbitration, 18(5) 549-571, 2001, 570-571. 
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enacted legislation concerning international arbitrations. There is also a federal act which 
governs international cases to which a federal entity is a party. This article will consider the 
International Commercial Arbitration Act (ICAA) of British Columbia (S.B.C. 1986, Ch. 14) 
as representative of legislation based on the UNCITRAL Model Law. Prior to the adoption of 
the Model Law the Supreme Court of Canada in the case of Szilard v Szasz [1955] S.C.R. 3, 
held that the parties to an arbitration are entitled to a sustained sense of confidence in the 
independence of mind of the arbitrators. Even a reasonable apprehension that an arbitrator was 
not acting impartially would lead to the award being set aside.  The provisions of the Model 
Law did not alter this judge-made rule. Article 18 of the Model Law (s. 18 ICAA) requires that 
the parties be treated with equality. Article 11 (s. 11 ICAA) requires consideration of the 
independence and impartiality of the nominee when it falls to a court to make a nomination 
when other appointment procedures fail. Article 13 (s. 13 ICAA) provides for judicial review 
of a challenge to an arbitrator where there are justifiable doubts as to the independence or 
impartiality of an arbitrator arising out of circumstances which become apparent to a party after 
the appointment of that arbitrator. Article 34 (s. 34 ICAA) provides for an award to be set aside 
if it is in conflict with the law or is contrary to public policy, both of which require impartiality 
on the tribunal. Disclosure by an arbitrator of any circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable 
doubts as to impartiality or independence is required pursuant to Article 12 (s. 12 ICAA). A 
duty of disclosure was also highlighted in the Szilard v Szasz [1955] S.C.R. 3 case. Under the 
Model Law the same standard of impartiality and independence is applied to all members of 
the tribunal. The Model Law and ICAA are silent as to a prohibition on communication with 
the parties outside the hearing except that the ICAA does provide for involvement in mediation 
and conciliation or other procedures by the tribunal to encourage settlement (s. 30). There is 
no specific reference in these laws to the secrecy of deliberations but it would be expected that 
any significant communication with the parties would violate the duty of impartiality. Unless 
otherwise agreed by the parties, decisions must be made by a majority (Article 29 Model Law 
and s. 29 ICAA).71 
 
7.6. AUSTRALIA 
 
On 17 June 2010, the Australian Federal Parliament passed a law making certain 
amendments to the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) (IAA), amongst which were 
                                                          
71 Ibid, 36. 
23 
 
provisions adopting the real danger test as the standard for bias challenges to international 
arbitrators. On 22 June 2010, the real danger standard was also enacted as part of the New 
South Wales domestic Commercial Arbitration Act 2010 (NSWCAA) making Australia the 
first country to incorporate the real danger test into its written arbitration law, and the first 
member of the UNCITRAL Model Law community of states to make 'Model Law Plus' 
additions in the area of arbitrator independence and impartiality.72  
The adoption of the real danger test has been made as an elucidation to the challenge 
rule set out under Model Law, art. 12.  Australian common law recognises the test for apparent 
bias laid down in R. v. Sussex Justices Ex p. McCarthy.73 To date, this test has been held to be 
applicable to arbitrators as well as judges and other tribunal members. However, the 
amendment to incorporate the real danger test materially alters the Common Law position 
insofar as it applies to arbitrators.   
Section 18A of the IAA provides firstly that  the purposes of Article 12(1) of the Model 
Law, there are justifiable doubts as to the impartiality or independence of a person approached 
in connection with a possible appointment as arbitrator only if there is a real danger of bias on 
the part of that person in conducting the arbitration and secondly that  for the purposes of 
Article 12(2) of the Model Law, there are justifiable doubts as to the impartiality or 
independence of an arbitrator only if there is a real danger of bias on the part of the arbitrator 
in conducting the arbitration, {emphasis added) The same approach is taken in section 12 of 
the NSWCAA. The drafting of the amendment to incorporate the real danger test is such that 
the Model Law notion of justifiable doubts is preserved in IAA, section 18A, with the real 
danger test functioning more as an internal evidentiary standard rather than a rule in its own 
right. This is consistent with the judiciary approach in England in R. v. Gough74, where the 
courts applied the then-applicable common law real danger test to challenges under section 
24(1 )(a) of the AA 1996 which borrows justifiable doubts from article 12 of the Model Law. 
However, it is important to observe that there is a gap between the text of section 18A 
and the elements of the test deployed in R. v. Gough.75 The test deployed in R. v. Gough76 stated 
that after having ascertained the relevant circumstances, the Court should ask itself whether, 
having regard to those circumstances, there was a real danger of bias on the part of the relevant 
                                                          
72 S. Luttrell, Australia Adopts the Real Danger Test for Arbitrator Bias, (2010) 26 Arbitration International 625-
632, 625. 
73 R. v. Sussex Justices Ex p. McCarthy [1924]1 K.B. 256 
74 R. v Gough [1993] A.C. 646.  
75 Ibid. 
76Ibid.   
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member of the tribunal in question, in the sense that he might unfairly regard (or have unfairly 
regarded) with favour, or disfavour, the case of a party to die issue under consideration by him. 
The main difference between the test laid down in R. v. Gough77 by Lord Goff of Chieveley 
and the content of IAA, section 18A is vantage. Where the test as set out in R. v. Gough78  has 
two arms - the first arm being reasonable court vantage and the second arm being the real 
danger standard itself - IAA, section 18A is express only in respect of the second arm. It might 
therefore be suggested that the first arm of the test in R. v. Gough79 is not necessarily part of 
IAA, section 18A, or NSWCAA, section 12.80   
Notwithstanding the above remark, although the submissions did propose the adoption 
of court vantage for bias challenges to arbitrators, which was expressed as the opinion of the 
court, nevertheless this aspect of the proposal was not taken up by the Attorney General in the 
amendment to incorporate the real danger test. This begs the question of whether actually the 
IAA, in its section 18A does incorporate both arms of the amendment to incorporate the real 
danger test as set in R. v. Gough81 or just the real danger standard. Certainly, the wording of 
section 18A IAA leaves open at least two possible outcomes, i.e. a) that the real danger standard 
applies, but the first arm (vantage) as set in R. v. Gough82 remains a Common Law matter and 
b) that the real danger standard applies, and so does the first arm as set in R. v. Gough83, with 
the effect that the common law test for apparent bias of arbitrators is taken to have been 
replaced telle quelle.  
It is supported84 that at least at first instance an Australian court would seek to preserve 
the common law to the extent it could, and that the outcome purporting the application of the 
real danger standard alongside the preservation of the first arm as set in R. v. Gough85 as a 
common law issue , not least due to the fact that the Australian courts have consistently placed 
a high priority on the observance of the principle that justice must not only be done but also be 
seen to be done. Bearing this principle in mind, one may also conclude that the Australian 
                                                          
77Ibid.   
78 Ibid.  
79 Ibid.  
80 S. Luttrell, Australia Adopts the Real Danger Test for Arbitrator Bias, (2010) 26 Arbitration International 
625-632, 626-627 
81 R. v Gough [1993] A.C. 646.  
82 Ibid.   
83 Ibid.  
84 S. Luttrell, Australia Adopts the Real Danger Test for Arbitrator Bias, (2010) 26 Arbitration International 
625-632, 631. 
85 R. v Gough [1993] A.C. 646.  
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courts are expected to adopt this position because the fair minded lay observer approach 
expressly personifies this maxim.86 
 
 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In arbitration, and in relation to its’ use as a method of alternative dispute resolution, 
the fact that arbitration proceedings are conducted behind closed doors, by people who are 
professionally linked to each other, increasingly gives rise to questions of independence. Hence 
arbitral party perceptions about what constitutes a doubt on the independence and impartiality 
of arbitrators vary, as per the different legal cultures.  
Even though existing solutions may be objective, yet they are applied in a highly 
subjective manner. This is understandable given the fact that at least impartiality, if not also 
independence, is an abstract concept, as well as due to the fact that its appraisal would 
necessarily involve an element of subjectivity. It is submitted that any arising problems may 
be minimised if policy considerations behind the usage of a particular solution are given due 
weight.  
Nowadays, a separate norm for arbitrators emerges as an even more than ever need. In 
an era of transparency such as the contemporary one, the stakes in any dispute are very high 
and it is submitted that other policy objectives, such as keeping the process cost effective et al., 
are not given as much importance as the independence and impartiality of the arbitrator. Thus, 
the perception of the parties should be duly considered. Any doubt should be resolved in favour 
of disqualification to enhance the integrity of the arbitral process.  
The increase of challenges to arbitrators is a consequence of the popularity and growth 
of arbitration as a method of alternative dispute resolution. Arbitrators should strive to be 
independent and impartial and have a general duty to disclose any circumstance that may raise 
doubts as to their impartiality and result in their appointment being judged as biased. This need 
for independent and impartial arbitral tribunals was demonstrated in recent case law such as 
Sierra Fishing Company v Farran87, Cofely Ltd v Bingham88, and W Ltd v M SDN BHD89. In 
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Sierra Fishing Company v Farran90 the Court found that there had been apparent bias in the 
conduct of the sole arbitrator. In Cofely Ltd v Bingham91 the court articulated the reasons which 
would be capable of classifying in the mind of a fair-minded observer a ground for bias. In W 
Ltd v M SDN BHD92 the court denied to follow the IBA Guidelines 2014 and classified them 
as solely a soft non-binding aid to the courts when assessing impartiality and independence.93 
The above allows us to conclude that the treatise of the issue of bias or arbitrators continues to 
receive a sparse, non-consistent and hence fragmented treatment by the courts. Lord Mustill 
believes that arbitrators stand squarely between the two parties and having no special affiliation 
to either because the right to nominate is part of the procedure for bringing the tribunal into 
existence. Once the arbitrator has accepted his office, all connection with his appointer 
becomes a matter of history.94 This model of rigid impartial independence however, does not 
accord with the courts' treatment of the parties’ expectation of independence and impartiality. 
In fact, the courts both in the USA and England have essentially rejected appearance of bias 
and have interpreted justifiable doubts in a manner that makes it extremely difficult to sustain 
a challenge to an arbitrator's impartiality or independence. That is, the courts have overruled 
the lower threshold standards argued by the plaintiff who is the paying customer, and have 
imposed a stricter standard that leads away from considering the issue from the parties’ eyes. 
In this sense, the courts' interventions on the issue of independence and impartiality show that 
it is incorrect to say that the arbitration agreement is the root of international commercial 
arbitration.95 
In defining bias, there is one interesting difference between English law and others, 
particularly civil law systems and certainly those jurisdictions which have adopted the Model 
Law or which take a Model Law approach, i.e. the distinction between impartiality and 
independence. The Model Law (art. 12) specifies justifiable doubts as to the independence (as 
well as impartiality) of an arbitrator as grounds for his removal. There is no proof however 
that, in consensual arbitrations, this is either required or desirable. So, what therefore should 
we try to do? To answer this question one needs first to decide as a matter of policy which is 
the greater mischief, i.e. the compromise of the integrity of the process through the definition 
of impartiality by a very wide standard, or the adoption of a narrow standard, which bears the 
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danger to result in hindering altogether the integrity and efficacy of the process via too many 
and unmeritorious challenges, motivated often only by tactical considerations and sometimes 
crossing the line between permissible guile and sharp practice. It is suggested that perhaps the 
latter is the greater mischief.96 In the legislative regimes examined herein, international 
arbitrators must remain independent and impartial unless the parties choose otherwise. 
Although couched in different language, each of the countries requires a similar general 
standard of impartiality. In the USA, an arbitrator must avoid evident partiality. In England, 
the test is a real suspicion of bias. France requires an objective appearance of impartiality as 
would be expected of a judge. Italy promotes the principle of party autonomy in allowing 
parties to choose the criteria for impartiality and independence of the arbitrators, otherwise 
applies the relevant rules of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure (art. 51,52). No test has yet 
been established under the new Swiss law. In Canada, an arbitrator in an international 
proceeding could be disqualified if there is a reasonable apprehension of bias. In Australia, the 
2010 amendment of the IAA to include the real danger test, introduced a somewhat higher bar 
for challenges than the one usually97 by requiring that a fair minded and informed observer 
would say that there was a real possibility that the arbitrator was biased. 
Courts have used several standards in various jurisdictions when applying the 
impartiality and independence principle. Many Common Law jurisdictions have adopted a test 
based on the notion that justice must be seen to be done98 and the same test was adopted in 
Australia.99, 100  
In all systems canvassed, the degree of independence may vary based on circumstances 
and commercial realities. A limited degree of connection with the parties, is not, and should 
not, generally be viewed or perceived as a violation of public policy. Strict requirements of 
disclosure of relationships to the parties or the dispute are required in all of the systems. Rules 
of disclosure will usually resolve any problems with independence.  Impartiality is not so 
flexible as a concept. There is much less tolerance with respect to a lack of impartiality in the 
conduct of the arbitration. Absent clear authorisation from the parties, partiality will be a valid 
ground for challenge of an arbitrator. Where the evidence of partiality was not discovered until 
after the award, the award itself or its enforcement may be challenged. It falls to the arbitrators 
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to maintain strict impartiality both as a matter of law and of professionalism. In addition, where 
an impartial tribunal is chosen or required by law it is incumbent upon the national court having 
jurisdiction to enforce requirements of independence and impartiality. This is one area where 
the courts should not adopt the hands-off approach typical of arbitration if they are vigilant in 
protecting the fundamental equation that such an arbitration is premised upon, that is, that the 
case will be decided by an independent and impartial tribunal on the basis of evidence put 
forward and for no other reason.101  
The 2014 IBA Guidelines reinforce the protection of impartiality in arbitration. A 
fundamental principle underlying them is that each arbitrator must be impartial and 
independent of the parties at the time he or she accepts an appointment to act as arbitrator, and 
must remain so during the entire course of the arbitration proceeding, including the time period 
for the correction or interpretation of a final award under the relevant rules, assuming such time 
period is known or readily ascertainable. Similarly, they dictate the need for the arbitrator to 
decline the appointment if he has doubts as to his or her ability to be impartial and independent 
and set an objective test for disqualification.  As to the much criticised “Non-Waivable Red 
List” of the 2014 IBA Guidelines, it simply describes circumstances that necessarily raise 
justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator’s impartiality or independence. The 2014 IBA Guidelines 
also protect the parties’ interest in being fully informed of any facts or circumstances that may 
be relevant in their view, and set the time bar for raising objections in relation to conflicts of 
interest within a 30-day period.  In an effort to balance the interests of a party to appoint the 
arbitrator of its choice, who may be a partner at a large law firm, and the importance of 
maintaining confidence in the impartiality and independence of international arbitrators, they 
provide the rule that the arbitrator must, in principle, be considered to bear the identity of his 
or her law firm, but further on clarify that the activities of the arbitrator’s firm should not 
automatically create a conflict of interest. Last but not least, the parties are required to disclose 
any relationship with the arbitrator to reduce the risk of an unmeritorious challenge of an 
arbitrator’s impartiality or independence based on information learned after the appointment.  
Similarly, the Practice Note PN-01/17 (31.3.2017) adopted by SIAC providing 
guidance for arbitrators regarding disclosure in relation to cases involving external funding, 
should be seen as a blessing rather than a curse. At first glance it may be regarded by many as 
an additional restriction hindering rather than promoting the arbitration as a dispute resolution 
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mechanism. However, in world where transparency is a maxim, such guidelines help promote 
efficacy and fairness.  
As a last comment, it is worth mentioning that due to the fact that challenge decisions 
by arbitral institutions are generally not reasoned, let alone published, it is not entirely clear 
what exact standards these institutions apply.102An indeed commendable exception to this rule 
is the LCIA, which in 2006 voted to publish abstracts of its reasoned decisions on challenges 
to arbitrators.103,104 
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